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For the first time since 2008, economic alarm bells are ringing in China. Hard on the heels of a two-
month stock market rout, the Chinese yuan lost nearly five percent of its value in just two days. The 
stock market might have rebounded, but the economy is still in trouble. Three and a half decades of 
easy profits from one-way bets on China's reintegration with the outside world have come to an 
end. China is now part and parcel of the global economy, and the normal laws of economic gravity 
apply in China, too. The first of those laws is that there's no such thing as a free lunch. 
There is a financial crisis brewing in China, but the usual bugbears of the stock market, declining 
exports, and even the yuan crash are only appetizers, not the main course. The coming crisis has 
much more to do with demographic stagnation, capital flight, and the decision in 2013 to give the 
market a “decisive” role in China's economic development. These trends will combine over the next 
few years to make it increasingly difficult for administrators at all levels of the Chinese government 
to meet their financial obligations. 
The problem in a nutshell is that as China develops into a middle-income country, the social 
demands placed on its government are rising faster than the country’s GDP. The recent slowdown in 
GDP growth has only exacerbated a long-standing trend. Social luxuries such as free public 
education, adequate health care, and old-age pensions are expensive, and as Americans and 
Europeans know all too well, their costs tend to rise faster than inflation. China's rapidly aging 
population will require more and more of these services in the future. 
THE TAXMAN COMETH 
So far, China has kept up with expanding budgetary demands through improved tax efficiency and 
large-scale asset sales. These are both one-time fixes. In 2008-–09, China restructured its value-
added and corporate income taxes, reducing most headline tax rates while improving the efficiency 
of collection. Revenues from these sources have shot up in recent years, roughly doubling in nominal 
terms since 2009. In fact, total government revenue as a percentage of GDP has risen from an all-
time low of just over ten percent in the mid-1990s to around 22.7 percent in 2013. 
That is still on the low side, even for a middle-income country such as China. In Mexico, government 
revenue as a percentage of GDP is 24.4 percent. In Russia, it is 40.7 percent (or was pre-crisis), 
according to the latest data from the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. In 
Brazil, the ratio is around 34 percent. At 31.2 percent, the United States has the lowest government 
revenue as a percentage of GDP among rich OECD countries—and, of course, the United States 
spends well beyond these means. Major European countries score in the high 40s and low 50s. 
It is often said that China will get old before it gets rich; it is perhaps equally true that the Chinese 
economy will get liberalized before it gets taxed.  To be sure, China's large social security tax 
revenues are opaque and are not included in these figures. They may account for an additional five 
percent of GDP, bringing total government revenue above that of Mexico. Anecdotal evidence 
suggests, however, that this locally administered system is extraordinarily corrupt and the social 
security taxes actually paid into government accounts may be much less than the notional amounts 
that employers report. 
After increasing rapidly in 2010 and 2011 owing to tax reform, China's annual government revenue 
growth has since fallen below ten percent and is now roughly in line with GDP growth. In other 
words, China's receipts are stable and rising in line with GDP. This is to be expected in a tax system 
such as China's, which relies heavily on corporate income, consumption, and value-added taxes—all 
of which are flat or regressive. In theory, China does have a high and progressive personal income 
tax system, with a top marginal rate of 45 percent, but enforcement is extremely lax. Individual 
income tax receipts account for just five percent of total government revenue. 
A FISCAL BRICK WALL 
China's ability to continue increasing the quality of social services in line with the expectations of its 
people depends on its capacity to increase taxes. Even existing levels of service provision will soon 
become impossible within China's current fiscal framework, thanks to rising costs and population 
aging. The proportion of the population aged 65 and over will increase from ten percent to nearly 21 
percent between 2015 and 2035, according to U.S. Census Bureau projections. The elderly are 
expensive users of government services, and after four decades of one-child families, there just 
aren't enough younger people to care for them all. 
Fully aware of the demographic time bomb, the Chinese government is desperately encouraging 
people to have more children—with little success. Ironically, if the government does succeed in 
raising the birthrate above the low levels found in Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan, its demographic 
crisis will get worse before it gets better. For the first 20 to 30 years of a baby boom, China would 
have to bear the costs of raising more children without any increase in its work force. In fact, its 
work force would decline further as (mainly) women take time off to raise families. 
China's leaders must be aware of the fiscal brick wall that blocks China's road to development, and 
they must know how hard it will be to break through it. Finding new sources of revenue will not be 
easy. Capital gains go largely untaxed in China owing to rampant evasion, and most stock market 
gains are not taxed at all. China's current plans for tax reform are relatively modest, but an obvious 
next step is to beef up the collection of capital gains taxes. Knowing that the taxman is on his way, 
China's rich are doing everything they can to get their assets (or at least legal jurisdiction over their 
assets) out of the country. 
Tax enforcement will be made all the more difficult by the government's 2013 Third Plenum pledge 
to embrace a "decisive" role for the market in the economy, which was widely taken to mean that 
strategic, highly taxed sectors would be exposed to market forces. Its ensuing plans to open its 
capital account to full convertibility further compromised the government's ability to harness the 
economy. As it now loosens its grip on the country's financial sector, the government stands to lose 
another important tool in the fight against tax evasion. These reforms may be economically 
necessary, but they do reduce the government's fiscal options. Companies that were once part of 
the government are increasingly operating in their own interests—and these may conflict with those 
of the country as a whole. 
ROOM FOR MANEUVER 
China escaped the 2008 global financial crisis almost totally unscathed, despite suffering a 16 
percent decline in exports in 2009 as compared with 2008. The exports collapse was offset by a 
decisive government stimulus program that pumped $586 billion into the economy. Unlike the U.S. 
stimulus program, which mainly provided supply-side capital to banks, the Chinese program was a 
classic Keynesian demand-side intervention. In addition to preventing an economic catastrophe, 
China got airports, subway systems, high-speed rail, and a bevy of much-needed infrastructure. 
Today, a more liberalized China has much less room for maneuver. In 2008, the state-owned 
companies were under the direct control of government; in 2015, many are quasi-independent. In 
2008, capital controls prevented foreign investment from leaving the country; in 2015, even Chinese 
funds have many avenues for exit. China can still borrow its way out of trouble, as it did in 2008, but 
the political climate is now poor for major public works, and liberalization has made the economy 
much leakier than it was before. And if China borrows now as it did then, it is not clear when it will 
be able to pay the money back. 
It is often said that China will get old before it gets rich; it is perhaps equally true that the Chinese 
economy will get liberalized before it gets taxed. Liberalization without taxation will push the 
Chinese government into the familiar Third World pattern of perpetual fiscal crisis. A Chinese state 
that raises money primarily through regressive taxes and struggles to meet its welfare obligations 
will look a lot like the rest of the Third World that China supposedly left behind years ago. A 
declining yuan is only a prelude to this kind of crisis, not a final act. 
